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THE REPLACEMENT AND AUGMENTATION
SYSTEMS IN EUROPE
(1945-1963) (U)

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FOREWORD (U)

(U) The purpose of this study is to provide the U.S. Army staff, commands, and service schools with a complete and fully documented account of the replacement and augmentation systems used to maintain the United States ground forces in Europe at their required strength. The study is a comprehensive review from 1945 to 1963 and explores the strengths and weaknesses of the various systems, their interrelation, and their impact on the combat readiness of the U.S. Army in Europe.

(U) It was prepared by Major Edward M. Bradford, Commanding Officer of the 10th Military History Detachment, with the assistance of the staff of the Historical Section, Operations Division, and is based on research in USAREUR headquarters files and on interviews with personnel on the staff and operating levels.

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<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
ROAD	Reorganization Objectives Army Divisions
ROC ID	Reorganization of the Current Infantry Division
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
TARS	Theater Army Replacement System
TRUST	Trieste United States Troops
UP	United Press
USAAF	U.S. Army Air Forces
USFA	U.S. Forces, Austria
USFET	U.S. Forces, European Theater
wkly	weekly

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Chapter 6

The Augmentation of 1961 (U)

24. (C) Scope

In the summer of 1961, as the communist threat to West Berlin grew more ominous, the need for showing U.S. determination became urgent. On 11 August, two days before the East Germans began to erect the Berlin Wall, Secretary of Defense R. S. McNamara announced that he was considering a temporary augmentation of the U.S. forces in Europe to meet the Berlin situation. He approved for planning purposes the so-called Roundout concept, which comprised both individual fillers and units. Roundout would provide USAREUR with an augmentation of approximately 45,000 spaces that would fill its TOE personnel deficiencies both in combat- and service-support type units, make possible the mechanization of its three infantry divisions, and increase its combat effectiveness by providing a better balance in the force structure.

Gen. B. C. Clarke, then CINCUSAREUR, urged that all Roundout forces be sent to Europe as soon as possible, irrespective of the final decision concerning other deployments.¹ However, while the Roundout units would provide a better balance in the force structure and improve the capability for initial combat, they would not provide a capability for sustained

¹(1) Cable ECJCDO-9-91420, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 11 Aug 61. SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-4). (2) Army-Navy-Air Force Journal, 26 Aug 61, p. 1. UNCLAS. (3) Seventh Army Ann Hist, 1961, pp. 1 - 3. SECRET. NOFORN (info used CONF). (4) Hq USAREUR, 1962, Report of Stewardship, October 1960 - April 1962, General Bruce C. Clarke, CINCUSAREUR and COMCENTAG (hereafter cited as Stewardship), pp. 15, 119 - 20. UNCLAS.

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fighting.²

In supporting General Clarke, Gen. L. Norstad, then USCINCEUR, stressed that all Roundout forces were needed, even though the political significance of deploying them might make it advisable to phase their movement for minimum or maximum political reaction, as desired.³

25. (C) Authorization

(C) On 7 September 1961, the Department of the Army authorized the mechanization of USAREUR's infantry divisions and allocated the 3,000 spaces required. These were the first troops authorized, and personnel to fill the spaces were airlifted to reach Europe by 31 October.⁴

(C) Two days later the Secretary of Defense authorized the deployment of approximately 37,000 additional troops to round out the USAREUR units but excluded the port personnel. The first group, to be shipped by sea to arrive in Europe no later than 1 November, would consist of from 15,000 to 16,000 troops. This contingent would be followed by other sea-transported troops, comprising from 1,000 to 2,000 men, to arrive no later than 15 December. In addition, about 19,000 individual replacements and filler personnel would be shipped by air to bring USAREUR units to full strength; 12,000 would arrive by 31 October, and the remaining 7,000 within 15 days.⁵

(C) In early September General Clarke modified a previous request and asked that an armored cavalry regiment be sent to Europe as soon as practicable, irrespective of decisions concerning the augmentation of

²Cmt 2, USAREUR Log Div to Ops Div, 29 Oct 63, to DF, Ops Div to distr, 10 Oct 63, subj: Review of Draft Monograph "The Replacement and Augmentation Systems in Europe (1945 - 1963)." AEAGD-PL. SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-3).

³Cable ECJCP-9-91443, USCINCEUR to JCS, 13 Aug 61. SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-4).

⁴(1) Cable DA-902174, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Sep 61. CONF. Gp-4.
(2) Memo, CINCUSAREUR to CofSA, 22 Aug 61, subj: Implementation of ROAD-65 by USAREUR. SECRET (info used UNCLAS). (3) Stewardship, cited above, pp. 16, 80 - 81. UNCLAS.

⁵(1) Cable DA-902277, DA to CINCUSAREUR and USCONARC, 9 Sep 61.
(2) Cable SX-5508, CINCUSAREUR to distr, 10 Sep 61. Both SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-4). (3) Stars and Stripes (Eur ed), 9 Sep 61, p. 1.
(4) Army-Navy-Air Force Journal, 16 Sep, pp. 1, 27, and 7 Oct 61, p. 3.
(5) DOD Ann Rept, FY 1962, p. 17. All UNCLAS.

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USAREUR with Roundout units or divisional-size forces. General Norstad supported this request.⁶

(C) This matter came up again following an inquiry from the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the possibility of deploying an additional infantry division to Europe in October. General Clarke replied that he would be very happy to receive the division but insisted that the deployment of this division should not be considered as satisfying his request for an armored cavalry regiment. The regiment was needed to provide rear-area security and antiairborne defense of the Rhine--a mission to which three combat battalions would have to be diverted in wartime.⁷

(U-FOUO) In October the Secretary of Defense announced that the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment would be deployed in Europe,⁸ and during the following month the regiment arrived at Bremerhaven and moved to its assigned stations in Europe. It was the largest single unit of the 1961 augmentation.⁹

26. (C) Personnel Implications

a. (C) Involuntary Extensions. Concomitant with the planned buildup in troop strength, the Department of the Army extended, up to four months, all enlistments that would expire normally between 1 October 1961 and 30 June 1962, and also added one year to individual Ready Reserve obligations normally ending during that period. In addition, all tours in the USAREUR area were extended six months. Requests of Regular Army officers for voluntary retirement after 1 November were screened, and those considered contrary to the Army's best interests were deferred. Reserve officers scheduled to be relieved from active duty before 30 June 1962, were encouraged to ask for indefinite retention.

⁶(1) Cable DA-902035, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 5 Sep 61. (2) Cable ECJCJ-9-92878, USCINCEUR to JCS, 9 Sep 61. Both SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-4). (3) Army-Navy-Air Force Journal, 9 Sep, p. 9, and 16 Sep 61, pp. 1, 27. UNCLAS.

⁷(1) Cable SX-5836, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 23 Sep 61. SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-4). (2) Time (Atlantic ed), 13 Oct 61, p. 18. (3) Army-Navy-Air Force Journal, 21 Oct 61, pp. 1, 9. (4) Briefing for Dr. Heinrich Lübke, President of the Federal Republic of Germany, by USAREUR, 17 May 63. In USAREUR Ops Div Hist Sec files. All except (1) UNCLAS.

⁸Cable DA-576256, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 11 Oct 61. UNCLAS.

⁹(1) Cable OA-12, 3d ACR to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Nov 61. SECRET (info used U-FOUO). (2) Stewardship, cited above, p. 110. UNCLAS.

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Since the number so retained was not sufficient to meet the requirements of the buildup, the tours of other selected Reserve officers on active duty were extended involuntarily for periods not to exceed one year. In some cases, individual enlisted, warrant officer, and commissioned Reservists possessing certain essential skills were recalled to active duty for one year.¹⁰

b. (U) Ban on Overseas Travel of Dependents. Because of the logistical requirements of the buildup, and to free sea and air transport for the movement of troops, the Department of Defense suspended the government-paid transportation of dependents of military personnel and civilian employees to Western Europe--except to West Berlin--for an indefinite period.¹¹

The Department of Defense realized clearly that one probable effect of curtailing the transportation of dependents to Europe at government expense would be an increase in the number of so-called "unauthorized"¹² dependents brought to Europe at the sponsor's expense. USAREUR anticipated that the upsurge of unauthorized dependents would offset the departure of the approximately 12,000 dependents returning to the United States during April, May, and June 1962, upon expiration of their sponsor's 6-month tour extensions.¹³

When the augmentation was completed, the dependent travel ban was retained because of the U.S. balance of payments problem. At about the same time, however, it was announced that before 1 February 1962, the Secretary of Defense would reevaluate the suspension of dependent travel. The ban was rescinded on 25 April 1962, because of its adverse effect on the morale of troops and their dependents, and its ineffectiveness in stemming the outflow of gold.¹⁴

¹⁰(1) Cable DA-90177, 16 Aug 61. CONF. Gp-4. (2) Cables DA-569161 and -569422, 17 and 18 Aug 61. Both UNCLAS. (3) Cable DA-573297, 19 Sep 61. U-FOUO. All DA to CINCUSAREUR et al.

¹¹(1) Cable DA-572081, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 9 Sep 61. (2) Cable SC-55408, CINCUSAREUR to subor comds, 13 Sep 61. (3) Cable DA-575505, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 4 Oct 61. All UNCLAS.

¹²The terms "authorized" and "unauthorized" dependents were changed in 1963 to "command sponsored" or "individual sponsored." (USAREUR Wkly Bul 20, 4 Jun 63, p. 3). UNCLAS.

¹³(1) AR 55-46, 16 Nov 59, subj: Travel of Dependents and Accompanied Civilian Personnel to Overseas Areas. (2) Cable SC-58535, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 16 Oct 61. Both UNCLAS.

¹⁴Cables DA-585011 and -599041, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 27 Dec 61 and 25 Apr 62. Both UNCLAS.

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27. (U-FOUO) Receipt of the Augmentation Forces

- a. (U) Individuals. The arrival of individual filler personnel presented no unusual problems and generated no special requirements for billeting or related facilities. They were received and processed in the same manner as normal pipeline replacements.
- b. (U) Units. The arrival, reception, and housing of units, however, was more involved because of the need to maintain unit integrity. To facilitate the reception, a sponsor or host unit of the same type and size was designated for each augmentation unit. The sponsor unit was informed of the incoming unit's assignment and European home station, its overseas readiness and port dates, the arrival date of the advance party, and the departure date and expected time of arrival of the main body. Through direct communication the sponsor unit was able to provide the augmentation unit with much useful information before it left the United States, which facilitated advance planning and later adjustment to the operational environment of USAREUR. The sponsor unit met both the advance party and the main body at the arrival airfield and port and assisted the new unit in getting settled by providing administrative and logistical support until the arrival and processing of the unit's own equipment.
- c. (U) Port Utilization. Although USACOMZEUR would have preferred to make greater use of French ports, the primary facilities used during the augmentation were the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation and Rhein-Main Airbase. However, since a large number of troops had to be received in a short time, some deviations from normal procedures were necessary. For example, five ships carrying 4,570 troops to USACOMZEUR were unloaded at Cherbourg, a port that U.S. forces did not ordinarily use. In addition, much unit equipment, which normally would have entered through the French ports, was received at Bremerhaven to expedite its delivery. Nonetheless, sufficient equipment was received in the normal manner through the French ports to utilize fully the port handling capabilities of the Communications Zone and to exercise the line of communications across France to Germany or to depots in France.
- d. (U) Movement to Home Stations. Although the augmentation forces arrived primarily by sea, planning provided that some elements, such as small detachments, advance parties, and driver packets, would unload at Rhein-Main Airbase and other airfields in France and Germany. Upon arrival, troops were moved by rail or truck to their new home stations.

Equipment and supplies arriving on cargo ships were sorted, moved to processing areas, and prepared for movement to the incoming unit's new station--or, in the case of supplies, to the depot, where they were integrated into existing stocks. Unit personnel who were needed to assist in the receipt and movement of the equipment arrived either

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on the same ship with it or were diverted from shipside or arrival airfields to the processing area.

Tanks and other heavy equipment were moved from the ports to their final destination by rail. Wheeled vehicles, driven by organic personnel whenever practicable, were formed into convoys by USACOMZEUR port personnel and dispatched at appropriate intervals to their home stations. USAREUR military police provided highway movement and traffic control, and other units established overnight rest and messing facilities and refueling points at three locations in France and two in Germany.¹⁵

e. (U-FOUO) Facilities. (U) One of the basic problems of the augmentation was the provision of minimum essential facilities for the incoming troops. The capability to provide such facilities influenced to a large degree the location and stationing of the augmentation forces.¹⁶

(U-FOUO) A major area of concern was troop housing. The existing facilities were used fully by reducing the space allocation per soldier to 40 square feet, rehabilitating attics, and reducing diverted space--dayrooms, supply rooms, etc. In France, however, it was necessary to billet troops in tent camps at eight locations.¹⁷ Later, by the end of December 1961, all these troops had been moved into newly-erected prefabricated buildings or had been restationed at other USACOMZEUR installations.¹⁸

28. (C) The Possibility of Further Augmentations

a. Prepositioning of Equipment. During September USAREUR considered plans for the possible arrival of additional divisions and forwarded to USCINCEUR the tentative stationing plan for these units.¹⁹

¹⁵(1) USAREUR Qtrly Hist, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 61, pp. 23 - 24, 143 - 45. TS. NOFORN (info used UNCLAS). (2) Stewardship, cited above, pp. 119 - 20. UNCLAS.

¹⁶(1) Intvw, Mr. J. Borrer, USAREUR Ops Div Hist Sec, with Mr. W. M. Pool, USAREUR Log Div Instl Br, 18 Apr 62. (2) DOD Ann Rept, FY 1962, p. 109. Both UNCLAS.

¹⁷Briefing for MAAG, Bonn, by USAREUR, 13 Mar 62. In USAREUR Log Div Const Sec files. CONF (info used U-FOUO).

¹⁸Cable SC-62745, CINCUSAREUR to distr, 6 Dec 61. U-FOUO.

¹⁹(1) Cable SX-5664, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 15 Sep 61. SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-4). (2) Army-Navy-Air Force Journal, 16 Sep 61, p. 27. UNCLAS. (3) Cable SX-5836, 23 Sep 61, cited above. SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-4).

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In early October, General Norstad, in conjunction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, conceived the idea of assembling the bulk of the equipment for two or three Army divisions and placing it in Europe, while holding the division personnel in the United States, on call and prepared to be airlifted overseas. It was thought that the divisions could be operationally ready in Europe within 14 days after the movement was directed.

On 12 October the Department of the Army notified USAREUR that one complete set of organizational equipment for an infantry division and one complete set for an armored division would be prepositioned at nine different locations in Europe. On the last day of October the prepositioning of additional equipment for 10 support units was authorized. The prepositioning of equipment was considered a matter of urgency, with 7 December being the target date for completing its essential features for the divisions and 3 January 1962 for the support units.²⁰

Liaison and maintenance detachments, requested by USAREUR and authorized by the Department of the Army, were to keep the equipment in such a condition that the two divisions and their support units would be fully operational shortly after arriving in Europe. This portion of the augmentation totaled 3,350 troops who arrived in Europe during late October and early November. Shortly after their arrival, the detachments were receiving equipment at the prepositioning sites. The equipment was ready and virtually all aspects of the prepositioning phase were completed by mid-December.²¹

b. The Deployment of Additional Divisions. USAREUR had meanwhile been informed that the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not yet decided whether any augmentation divisions would be moved to Europe or, if so, when or under what conditions. Planning for such movements, however, was to be continuous, and by the end of 1961 or early 1962 one infantry and one armored division might have to be accommodated as a permanent augmentation at sites reasonably close to their ultimate tactical locations.²²

²⁰(1) TT-3659, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Oct 61. (2) Cable DA-904697, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 25 Oct 61. (3) Cable SX-6567, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 26 Oct 61. (4) Cable DA-905033, DA to distr, 31 Oct 61. All SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-4). (5) Stewardship, cited above, pp. 125 - 26. UNCLAS.

²¹(1) Cable SX-7533, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 13 Dec 61. SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-4). (2) Stewardship, cited above, pp. 81, 125 - 27. UNCLAS.

²²Cable ECJCO-9-97510, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 27 Nov 61. SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-4).

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USAREUR's previous plans for stationing and billeting had been based on the assumption that the two divisions would be deployed to Europe only if the international situation grew worse and under conditions making tactical considerations paramount. Under such circumstances the construction of tent cities would be advisable. It now appeared, that if the two divisions were moved to Europe at all, their deployment would take place under peacetime conditions or when war was imminent. In either case a completely different billeting and construction plan would be required. Moreover, under peacetime conditions no tent camps would be established unless absolutely unavoidable. At the turn of the year, therefore, USAREUR began a long-term stationing plan to provide billets for the two divisions in existing or new semi-permanent facilities. If the divisions were sent to Europe on very short notice, certain support units in France would have to be placed in tent camps, but these would be replaced by prefabricated buildings as soon as possible. USAREUR was cautioned that plans and cost estimates should be kept available but that implementation of such preparations would be subject to further instructions.²³

Ready in the United States were three 2-division forces including numerous support troops.²⁴

29. (C) Results Achieved

(C) The buildup of forces during the 1961 augmentation demonstrated the United States' ability to effect a significant increase in the size and readiness of its forces overseas at a time of crisis. By the end of 1961 all Roundout unit, filler, and replacement personnel scheduled for the USAREUR augmentation had arrived, thereby adding about 45,190 troops to the command's approximate 225,000 personnel. (See Chart 3.)

(C) With the addition of the augmentation units, including the armored cavalry regiment; the prepositioning of equipment; and the continuous arrival of the new equipment to permit mechanization of the infantry divisions, the U.S. ground forces in Europe enjoyed their strongest posture since World War II for limited sustained combat. The three infantry divisions stationed in Germany were converted into mechanized units, the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment guaranteed the security of the rear area, and the arrival of additional artillery battalions and numerous other support units filled gaps in artillery, logistical, and support needs. The logistical posture was strengthened by the

²³(1) Cables SX-7135 and -7315, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 24 Nov and 3 Dec 61. (2) Cable ECJDC-9-98015, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Dec 61. All SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-3).

²⁴Cable SX-7397, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 7 Dec 61. SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-3).

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addition of a logistic command and over 60 technical service units which would support the field army during sustained combat. In addition, the prepositioning of equipment for the rapid integration of two divisions into the theater forces was considered a great stride toward insuring prompt and timely reinforcement at any time, if needed.²⁵

(U) The augmentation was accomplished at a total cost to USAREUR of \$66.2 million--\$10.2 for mechanization, \$6.0 for prepositioning, and \$50.0 million for the Roundout portion.²⁶ Unfortunately, funds were not immediately provided to support this augmentation. Consequently, many unproductive reprogramming actions had to be taken until the necessary funds were actually provided.²⁷

30. (C) Aftermath

USAREUR's actual strength rose from 266,132 on 1 January 1962, to 273,377 on 30 June, mainly as an after-effect of the augmentation. However, as a result of immediate and long-range reductions initiated by the Department of the Army, the end of 1962 strength dropped to 258,280.²⁸

This turn of events was not unexpected, since General Clarke had been forewarned as early as December 1961 of a proposed reduction of his command to its pre-Berlin-crisis strength when the threat subsided. Subsequently, return or inactivation of logistical- and service-support Roundout units and spaces to the United States was completed in FY 1963, and combat and combat support units were scheduled for return during

²⁵(1) Ltr, USAREUR to distr, 30 Nov 61, subj: Augmentation of USAREUR. AEAGC-PR. Gp-4. (2) Cable SX-7397, 7 Dec 61, cited above. Gp-3. Both SECRET (info used CONF). (3) Army-Navy-Air Force Journal, 9 Dec 61, p. 8. UNCLAS. (4) Cable ECJCO-9-99267, USCINCEUR to JCS, 29 Dec 61. (5) Cable SX-3078, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 26 Apr 62. (6) USACOMZEUR Ann Hist, 1961, pp. 1 - 37. NOFORN. All SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-4). (7) USAREUR Ann Hist, 1961, pp. 17 - 23, 182. TS. NOFORN (info used CONF. Gp-4). (8) Stewardship, cited above, pp. 15, 80 - 81, 110, 119 - 20, 125 - 27. UNCLAS.

²⁶Intvw, Mr. J. Borrer, with Mr. R. V. Wilson, USAREUR Compt Div Prog Br, 25 Jan 62. UNCLAS.

²⁷Stewardship, cited above, p. 47. UNCLAS.

²⁸(1) Cable SX-6711, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 9 Nov 62. SECRET (info used CONF.). (2) USAREUR Ann Hist, 1962, p. 182. TS. NOFORN (info used CONF). Both Gp-4.

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FY 1964.²⁹ The goal was a reduction to a strength figure that would be slightly above the pre-augmentation total by the end of FY 1964.³⁰

²⁹(1) Ltr, Gen B. C. Clarke, CINCUSAREUR, to Gen L. Norstad, USCINCEUR, 28 Dec 61. AEAGC. SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-3). (2) USAREUR Ann Hist, 1961, p. 117. (3) USAREUR Ann Hist, 1962, pp. 60 - 65. Both TS. NOFORN (info used CONF). (4) Seventh Army Qtrly Hist, 2d Qtr, CY 196² Ch 1, pp. 24 - 25. SECRET. NOFORN (info used CONF). All except (1) Gp-4.

³⁰Cable SX-6287, CINCUSAREUR to AMEMB, Bonn, 17 Sep 63. SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-3).

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Chapter 7

The LONG THRUST Exercises (U)

31. (C) The Concept

a. (C) Preliminary Planning. In September 1960 the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed that a strategic mobility exercise and a composite air strike force deployment exercise be conducted in Europe and Turkey during the first half of May 1961. The joint exercise was to improve the U.S. readiness posture; test contingency plans, including deployment and employment phases; and demonstrate U.S. interest in the areas of the exercises. Under the tentative joint exercise concept three battle groups would first be deployed from the United States to West Germany. One of these groups, augmented by tactical air force units, would deploy farther to a forward staging area for participation in a 5-day exercise that would involve seizing and securing an objective in Turkey.¹ In addition to being the first large-scale exercise of this type, LONG THRUST I would also involve the first overseas deployment of a large unit without dependents.²

At the end of April 1961 the President ordered the cancellation of LONG THRUST I because of the crisis in Laos. A planning and coordinating conference that was to be held in September to prepare for a LONG THRUST II

¹The Turkish phase was deleted in February 1961. (USAREUR Ann Hist, 1961, p. 165.) TS. NOFORN (info used CONF. Gp-4).

²Cable ECJCO-4820, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Sep 60. SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-4).

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exercise, that might be executed on 10 to 14 days' notice, had to be postponed because of the seriousness of the Berlin situation, but the planning continued.³

b. (C) The Revised Plan. (C) The plan for the rescheduled exercise substituted an infantry division for the airborne division originally earmarked for this purpose and made corresponding changes in the equipment and stocks to be prepositioned. The purpose of LONG THRUST, however, remained the same--to test the strategic mobility of ground forces, to exercise the equipment that was being prepositioned for two divisions, and to provide a temporary 2-battle-group augmentation for USAREUR.⁴

(U) The final plan called for airlifting three battle groups that would be moved to Rhein-Main Airbase, be issued prepositioned equipment, and travel to Hohenfels field training area for a 5-day field exercise. One of three battle groups would then return its equipment to storage, move back to Rhein-Main, and redeploy to the United States. One of the two battle groups remaining in Europe would replace the augmentation battle group in Berlin, which had been moved there on 19-20 August 1961 to reinforce the garrison.⁵

32. (C) The Implementation of the LONG THRUST Exercises

a. (C) LONG THRUST II-A. (C) The rescheduled exercise, called LONG THRUST II-A--the first to be actually held--was conducted in five phases, the first of which was the overseas deployment and movement to the prepositioned equipment. On 16 January the first elements of LONG THRUST II-A were flown to Europe, and in the next six days the Military Air Transport Service transported 5,290 men and 439.6 short tons of equipment in 102 sorties. Within a few hours after their arrival, the

³(1) Cable DA-903539, DA to USCINCEUR and CINCUSAREUR, 4 Oct 61. SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-4). (2) Seventh Army Ann Hist, 1961, p. 126. SECRET. NOFORN (info used UNCLAS).

⁴(1) Cable DA-904063, DA to USCONARC and CINCUSAREUR, 13 Oct 61. (2) Cable SX-6706, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 1 Nov 61. (3) Cable SX-6713, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 2 Nov 61. (4) Cable DA-906212, DA to USCONARC and CINCUSAREUR, 24 Nov 61. All SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-4). (5) Hq USAREUR, 1962, Report of Stewardship, October 1960 - April 1962, General Bruce C. Clarke, CINCUSAREUR and COMCENTAG (hereafter cited as Stewardship), pp. 81 - 82. UNCLAS.

⁵(1) Cable SH-32131, SACEUR to distr, 19 Dec 61. SECRET (info used UNCLAS). (2) Cable DEF-907490, DOD to USCINCEUR, 22 Dec 61. (3) Stewardship, cited above, p. 151. Both UNCLAS.

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troops moved to the prepositioning site where they completed Phase Two, the pickup of prepositioned equipment.⁶

(U-FOUO) The movement to the field training site at Hohenfels--Phase Three--required two days and was followed by the NATO-directed exercise--Phase Four--which began 30 January.⁷

(U-FOUO) The final phase--redeployment--started on 5 February, when the battle group that was to go back to the United States returned to the Mannheim area to reposition its equipment into active storage. It carried out its redeployment from 12 to 17 February. The other two battle groups arrived at their temporary stations on 5 and 6 February, respectively, to begin normal training and assume their operational commitments.⁸

b. (C) Other LONG THRUST Exercises. (C) Since peacetime Army regulations limited temporary changes of station to six months, plans were prepared for conducting LONG THRUST exercises every 90 days, thus guaranteeing the orderly rotation of battle groups and their maximum use while in Europe.⁹

(U) To obtain maximum use of airlift, a concurrent system of deployment and redeployment had been devised. This required that the organizational equipment of the redeploying force be prepositioned in active storage before deployment day, so that the outloading could begin as soon as the aircraft delivering the deploying force became available in Europe.¹⁰

(C) The next seven exercises, conducted at regular intervals throughout 1962 and the first half of 1963, became routine operations. Where necessary, improvements were made and deficiencies that had developed were corrected. For example, the 10 days originally allotted for the pickup of prepositioned equipment were found to be excessive since three days proved to be sufficient. In subsequent exercises this phase was further reduced to two days, which became the norm. On the

⁶(1) Cable SC-11864, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 21 Jan 62. UNCLAS.
(2) USAREUR After-Action Rept, 2 Apr 62, subj: Prepositioning for a Two Division Force, pp. 14 - 15, and Annex C. AEAOD. SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-4). (3) Incl 1 to ltr, USAREUR to DA, 17 Apr 62, subj: Final Report on Exercise LONG THRUST. AEAGX. U-FOUO.

⁷Incl 1 to ltr, USAREUR to DA, 17 Apr 62, cited above. U-FOUO.

⁸Ibid. U-FOUO.

⁹DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to CofS, 27 Apr 62, subj: Exercise LONG THRUST III. AEAGC-TOM. CONF. Gp-4.

¹⁰Cable SC-31422, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 22 Jun 62. UNCLAS.

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other hand, the deficiencies that were corrected included improving the self-sustenance of LONG THRUST battle groups by the attachment of divisional support units from the U.S.-based parent unit instead of having them depend on USAREUR support. Moreover, unit readiness time upon arrival in Europe was reduced by deploying soldiers with their own zeroed rifles and protective masks. In one subsequent exercise, an innovation to the rapid-turn-around method was used when the aircraft bringing the deploying troops to Europe were employed in another separate NATO exercise before transporting the redeploying battle group to the United States.¹¹

(C) Shortly before each new exercise, the Berlin augmentation battle group was exchanged with another LONG THRUST battle group, and the unit returning from Berlin became the redeploying battle group in the exercise.¹²

c. (C) Planning for the Discontinuance. During August 1962 USAREUR, supported by USEUCOM, advocated that the LONG THRUST exercises be continued but divorced from the Berlin augmentation, and that they be reoriented toward their original aim of field-exercising prepositioned equipment and practicing the rapid reinforcement of Europe.¹³

In December, Gen. E.G. Wheeler, Army Chief of Staff, indicated that he preferred to discontinue LONG THRUST as such, but that he had no objection to the general concept of strategic mobility exercises of from 3 to 5 weeks' duration.¹⁴ Gen. L.L. Lemnitzer, USCINCEUR, did not object to the termination of LONG THRUST but considered that some sort of strategic mobility exercise under NATO sponsorship was essential.¹⁵ The

¹¹(1) USAREUR Ann Hist, 1962, pp. 117- 26. TS. NOFORN (info used CONF). (2) Cable SX-4522, CINCUSAREUR to DA and USCINCEUR, 18 Jun 63. CONF. Both Gp-4.

¹²(1) Cable SX-4522, 18 Jun 63, cited above. CONF. Gp-4. (2) Cable SC-48998, CINCUSAREUR to DA and USCINCEUR, 22 Jul 63. UNCLAS.

¹³(1) Cable ECJCO-9-14604, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Sep 62. (2) Cables SX-5566 and -6282, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 18 and 22 Oct 62. (3) Cable ECJCO-9-18620, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Nov 62. (4) Cable SX-6847, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 15 Nov 62. (5) Cable ECJCO-9-19292, USCINCEUR to JCS, 21 Nov 62. All SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-3).

¹⁴Cable DA-922463, DA to USCINCEUR, 6 Dec 62. SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-3).

¹⁵(1) Cable ECJCO-9-20240, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR and USNMR, SHAPE, 8 Dec 62. (2) Cable SX-7350, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 11 Dec 62. (3) Cable ECJCO-9-21315, USCINCEUR to DA, 31 Dec 62. All SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-3).

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first step in discontinuing the LONG THRUST series, however, was to find a means for reinforcing the Berlin garrison.¹⁶

d. (C) Termination of the Series. The LONG THRUST exercise series was to end upon completion of LONG THRUST VIII in January 1964. The battle group deployed in LONG THRUST VII would be relieved in Berlin by a Seventh Army battalion upon completion of the Berlin Brigade's ROAD reorganization in October 1963, and would be returned to the United States without replacement the following month.¹⁷ It was planned that the absence of the battalion from Seventh Army would be compensated for by the deployment of U.S.-based units in a strategic mobility-type exercise.¹⁸

In late 1963 political considerations arose which seemed to make it inadvisable to terminate the series as planned. However, even though the possible continuation of LONG THRUST exercises into 1964 was under consideration, there was general agreement that the series should end as soon as it was politically expedient to do so.¹⁹

33. (C) Accomplishments

The seven LONG THRUST exercises conducted in 1962 and 1963 demonstrated the practicality and feasibility of both the strategic mobility and pre-positioning concepts. They also showed the Communists that the United States was capable of deploying combat-ready ground forces to Europe on short notice and providing rapid wartime augmentation. LONG THRUST, originally envisaged as a strategic mobility exercise, became a vehicle for exercising the prepositioned equipment and for augmenting the USAREUR forces at the time of the 1961 Berlin crisis.

¹⁶(1) Cable DA-922463, 6 Dec 62, cited above. SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-3). (2) Cable ECJCO-00078, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 3 Jan 63. UNCLAS. (3) Intvw, Maj E.M. Bradford, USAREUR 10th Mil Hist Det, with Maj W. Mastoris, Jr., USAREUR Ops Div O&T Br, 25 Apr 63. CONF. Gp-4.

¹⁷(1) Cable JCS-9931, JCS to USCINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE, 17 May 63. SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-3). (2) Cable ECJCO-13509, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 2 Aug 63. CONF. Gp-4.

¹⁸(1) Cable JCS-9966, JCS to USCINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE, 22 May 63. (2) Cable SX-5767, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 21 Aug 63. Both SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-4).

¹⁹Cable SX-6770, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 12 Oct 63. SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-3).

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The first LONG THRUST exercise showed that large bodies of troops could be deployed, issued prepositioned equipment, and made operational in a very short time--three to five days. Certain deficiencies were observed--the planning time had been insufficient, specific shortages of supplies needed for the maintenance of stored equipment had developed, the high security classification of the exercise hampered operations, and the support requirements had to be reevaluated--but subsequent deployments proved to be routine rotational operations.

In evaluating the deficiencies of the first exercise, however, it should be kept in mind that the plan for prepositioning equipment for two divisions was conceived and implemented in less than 90 days. The equipment had been assembled from stocks available in the theater, much of it was used and old, and both planning and execution were carried out at a time of international crisis and concurrent with numerous other augmentation needs.

LONG THRUST demonstrated its reliability as a means of rapid theater reinforcement by infantry troops utilizing air transport and prestocked equipment that would enable a divisional unit to engage in combat within a short time of arrival. The prepositioned equipment for the armored division was to be used during Exercise PIG LIFT in October - November 1963, and experience factors were expected to be available shortly afterward. Even before the execution of this exercise, it was to be assumed that the strategic mobility concept was sound so long as the prepositioned equipment was maintained in immediate combat-serviceable condition and both the troop units earmarked for its use and the airlift needed to move them to Europe were readily available.²⁰

²⁰(1) Stewardship, cited above, pp. 81 - 83, 127. UNCLAS. (2) USAREUR Ann Hist, 1962, pp. 117 - 26. (3) USAREUR Qtrly Hist, 1 Jan - 31 Mar 63, pp. 110 - 12. Both TS. NOFORN (info used CONF. Gp-4). (4) Cable DEF-937509, OSD to SACEUR and CINCSTRIKE, 21 Sep 63. UNCLAS.

USAREUR Command Strengths (1945 - 1963)


<u>End of Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Troop Strength</u>		<u>Enlistments Reenlistments</u>	<u>Other Gains a/</u>	<u>Command Sponsored Dependents b/</u>
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Authorized</u>			
1945	2,613,000	-	-		-
1946	278,042	262,154	51,140 c/		7,500
1947	103,749	117,155	11,112 d/	1,472 f/	29,108
1948	91,535	90,318	32,000 d/		33,011
1949	82,492	81,596	e/		33,179
1950	79,495	82,597	10,000 d/		40,994
1951	121,566	157,467	10,824 d/		44,756
1952	256,557	259,000	13,875	355	54,612
1953	243,842	258,000	9,865	252	58,144
1954	251,478	243,107	11,679	253	88,253
1955	247,624	238,438	18,206	5,067 g/	111,227
1956	250,277	241,158	14,145	300	129,281
1957	235,239	229,452	7,811	243	144,129
1958	227,844	231,508	7,091	69	157,827
1959	229,681	226,649	7,469		163,564
1960	226,513	228,163	10,638		177,368
1961	232,942	228,768	16,228		187,402
1962	(C) 277,583	(C) 273,377	23,058		177,400
1963	(C) 251,615	(C) 253,170	16,868		182,042
30 Sep 1963 h/	(C) 241,222	(C) 248,810	4,087		170,978

a/ Alien enlistees except as noted. b/ 1946 - 52 includes all EUCOM (Army-Navy-Air Force) and HICOG dependents. c/ Includes October to December 1945. d/ Approximate. e/ Not available. f/ Transfers from Mediterranean Theater. g/ Includes 5,000 absorbed from U.S. Forces, Austria. h/ Quarter ending.

SOURCES: (1) EUCOM Hist Div, OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE Series, 1945 - 49. (2) DA, The Army Almanac, (Washington, 1950), p. 633. (3) DA, Pocket Data Book Supplement, 1962, p. 16. (4) 1958 - 63 enlistment-reenlistment data. In USAREUR AG Div Mil Proc Br files. (5) USEUCOM, USAREUR Command Reports, Annual Narratives and Histories, 1950 - 63. All info used UNCLAS except 1962 - 63 troop strengths, CONF. Gp-4.

(C) CHART 1

USAREUR ENLISTED MECHANIZED REPLACEMENT SYSTEM



SOURCE: BRIEFING FOR DA & US CONARC BY USAREUR AG, 20-25 FEB 56, **SUBJ:** USAREUR ENLISTED MECHANIZED REPLACEMENT SYSTEM, P. 26. IN USAREUR AG DIV REF LIBRARY. UNCLAS.

(U) CHART 2

Army Augmentation Units in USAREUR by 31 December 1961

<u>Force</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>45,190</u>	
<u>Augmentation</u>	<u>41,840</u>	
Roundout Units	16,540	51 units in Germany and 38 units in France
1st Logistical Command	500	France
Mechanization	3,000	Assigned to the three in- fantry divisions of Seventh Army
Fillers	19,000	TOE units in Germany and France
3d Armored Cavalry Regiment	2,800	Germany
<u>Liaison and Maintenance Detachments *</u>	<u>3,350</u>	
4th Infantry Division	800	Germany
2d Armored Division	1,437	Germany and France
10 non-divisional support units	413	Germany and France
Initial Port Package *	700	Germany and France

* Personnel of these units remained assigned to their U.S.-based units and were on 180-day temporary duty with USAREUR. In 1962 the liaison-maintenance mission was assumed by USAREUR, which absorbed the personnel spaces within its strength ceiling.

SOURCES: (1) USAREUR Ann Hist, 1961, pp. 20 - 22, 27 - 28, 31. TS. NOFORN (info used CONF. Gp-3). (2) Stewardship, cited above, pp. 15, 80 - 81, 110, 126 - 27. UNCLAS.


Replacement and Augmentation Programs and Systems Used in Europe Since 1945

Program or System	Size	Year																							
		45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64				
Individual Replacement	Individual																								
4-Man Teams and Carrier Company	25-60 Teams	Aug 45						Aug 52				Mar 55			Sep 59										
Infantry Platoon (Unit Replacement)	TOE Infantry Platoon								Jan 54			Mar 55													
Gyroscope (Unit Rotation)	Division to Company										Mar 55				Sep 59										
Augmentations *	Division to Company							Mar 51			Dec 52														
	Regiment to Company																Oct 61			Jan 62					
LONG THRUST (Augmentation and Unit Rotation)	Infantry Battle Group																	Jan 62							
ROTAPLAN (Unit Rotation)	Infantry Battalion																	Oct 62			Aug 63				


* Also includes individual replacements.

SOURCE: Comd Repts and Ann Hists, 1945 - 1963, cited in Chapters 1 to 8. UNCLAS.


(U) CHART 4



<u>1961</u>	<u>Event</u>
15 March	A Department of Defense memorandum states that an urgent need for combat unit rotation without dependents is required.
25 March	USAREUR is notified of a proposed unit rotation plan between overseas and U.S. posts.
30 April	LONG THRUST scheduled for May is cancelled because of the crisis in Laos.
21 June	Department of the Army announces unit rotation without dependents: two airborne battle groups in USAREUR are to rotate with like units in the U.S., beginning in early 1962.
July	Increasing critical international situation terminates unit rotation planning in favor of large-scale troop augmentation.
11 August	The Secretary of Defense defines the scope of the augmentation.
16 August	All duty tours are extended involuntarily.
18 August	USCINCEUR is directed to reinforce the Berlin garrison with one battle group.
19 - 20 August	Berlin is reinforced by a reinforced USAREUR battle group.
30 August	LONG THRUST rescheduled for September is again cancelled because of the Berlin crisis, but preparations are continued to permit short notice execution.
7 September	The first augmentation of 3,000 troops to mechanize USAREUR's infantry divisions is authorized.
9 September	A further augmentation of 37,000 troops to round out USAREUR force structure is authorized.
3 October	Plan to preposition equipment for two divisions in Europe is announced.
9 October	Government-paid travel of dependents to Europe is suspended to free transportation for augmentation troops.



<u>1961</u>	<u>Event</u>
12 October	The Department of the Army directs the prepositioning of equipment for two divisions in Europe.
31 October	The prepositioning of equipment for 10 support units is directed.
9 November	3d Armored Cavalry Regiment arrives as an additional augmentation unit.
25 December	By this date all augmentation troops are housed in permanent buildings or newly-constructed prefabricated structures.
26 December	4th Replacement Group is redesignated 4th AG Replacement Group; replacement battalions and companies become AG units.
December	Prepositioning of equipment in Europe for two divisions and 10 support units is completed.
 <u>1962</u>	
13 January	USAREUR is informed that a new plan for overseas unit rotation without dependents is under consideration.
16 January	LONG THRUST II-A, the first exercise in the LONG THRUST series, begins.
5 February	Secretary of Defense is briefed by USAREUR DCSP&A on dependents overseas, gold flow, and unit rotation.
12 - 17 February	One of three LONG THRUST II-A battle groups redeploys to the United States.
7 April	LONG THRUST III begins.
25 April	The ban on government-paid dependent travel to Europe is rescinded.
1 May	Gen. P.L. Freeman, Jr., assumes duties of CINCUSAREUR and COMCENTAG, vice Gen. B.C. Clarke.
28 June	A new unit rotation plan, ROTAPLAN, is announced, with first rotation in October 1962.



1962

Event

1 July USAREUR begins to return Roundout logistical units to the United States, and assumes liaison and maintenance mission for prepositioned equipment.

9 July LONG THRUST IV begins.

13 September ROTAPLAN Phases II and III are scheduled for February and April 1963.

2 - 5, 14 - 15 October LONG THRUST V begins.

15 October First ROTAPLAN rotation takes place.

21 November USAREUR submits its initial ROTAPLAN evaluation.

30 November ROTAPLAN Phases II and III are deferred until September 1963 and February 1964, respectively.

1963

16 January LONG THRUST VI begins.

27 January USAREUR begins ROAD reorganization.

7 April LONG THRUST VII begins.

17 April Cycle 2, Phase I of ROTAPLAN begins.

15 May USAREUR submits final ROTAPLAN evaluation.

 1st AG Replacement Battalion is transferred to Vaihingen and attached to Seventh Army headquarters.

17 May Termination of LONG THRUST series upon completion of LONG THRUST VIII is envisaged.

23 May Planning is initiated for an armored division strategic mobility exercise.

1 July E-7's are included in manual requisitioning procedure for senior noncommissioned officers.

5 July 525th and 526th AG Replacement Companies are inactivated.

1963

Event

8 July	4th AG Replacement Group and 1st AG Replacement Battalion are reorganized.
15 July	Cycle 3, Phase I of ROTAPLAN begins.
19 July	LONG THRUST VIII begins.
4 August	ROTAPLAN program is cancelled.
1 September	ROAD reorganization of USAB begins.
1 September	Improvement in senior noncommissioned officer requisitioning is effected.
4 September	The four battalions that participated in the ROTAPLAN program exchange unit designations.
12 October	Continuation of LONG THRUST exercises is considered.
22 October	Exercise BIG LIFT begins.
25 - 28 October	LONG THRUST VII battle group redeploys without a counterpart unit rotating to Europe.

GLOSSARY (U)

This glossary contains abbreviations used in the text that are not listed in AR 320-50, 30 October 1961, or its changes.

<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
ACR	Armored Cavalry Regiment
AFF	Army Field Forces
ann	annual
BPE	Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation
COMCENTAG	Commander, Central Army Group
COMZ	Communications Zone
DCSP&A	Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Administration
ed.	edition
<u>et al.</u>	<u>et alii</u> (and others)
ETOUA	European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army
EUCOM	European Command (1947 - 1952)
FECOM	Far East Command
FOA	Foreign Operations Administration
GFRC	Ground Forces Reinforcement Command
HICOG	High Commissioner for Germany (U.S.)
<u>ibid.</u>	<u>ibidem</u> (in the same place)
IBM	International Business Machines
IRO	International Relief Organization
MTO	Mediterranean Theater of Operations
narr	narrative
OCH	Office of the Chief Historian
Ops Div	Operations Division
P&A	Personnel and Administration
PL	Public Law
RCT	Regimental Combat Team